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Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel are the first line of treatment and are
the first exposed health care workers to infectious diseases (IDs). Consequently, the
EMS setting is a relatively vulnerable environment for disease transmission and
cross-contamination. Also, serious and emerging IDs, such as highly pathogenic viral
hemorrhagic fevers and novel Coronaviruses, in a time of increased globalization,
require comprehensive EMS training and preparedness. This project had the
objective of identifying best practices for the EMS transport of patients with IDs. The
methods for this project were done in two phases. In the first stage, we conducted a
literature review to outline current practices. In the second, we convened an EMS-ID
Workgroup Meeting (held in Baltimore, MD, January 2020). The purpose of this
meeting was to gather national and international experts to provide input to the
University of Nebraska Medical Center to facilitate the development of an EMS-ID
training curriculum. A total of 25 national and international EMS-ID organizations,
along with CDC and ASPR officials, gathered to discuss best practices and work on
answering common EMS-ID problematic areas. Topics were grouped into seven
categories: equipment preparation, vehicle preparation, patient management, PPE
selection, team configuration, decontamination, and post-mission surveillance. We
report here the results of those discussions, highlighting the EMS Workgroup
perspectives and noting areas where agreement could not be reached.

iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................ii
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................. v
List of Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................................vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1
Statement of the Problem/Context ...............................................................................................................4
Significance of Study/Project ...........................................................................................................................5
Research Question ................................................................................................................................................5
Specific Aims............................................................................................................................................................6
Definitions of Terms.............................................................................................................................................6
Assumptions ............................................................................................................................................................8

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: ................................................................................................9
1. Literature of EMS Transport of Patients with HIDs: .........................................................................9
2. Literature on Educational Competency Development .................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION METHODS: ............................................................................ 18
Content Areas: ..................................................................................................................................................... 19
Sample Population:............................................................................................................................................ 20
Timelines: .............................................................................................................................................................. 21
Data Analysis:....................................................................................................................................................... 21

iv
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 22
Content Area #1: Special Equipment Preparation: ............................................................................. 22
Content Area #2: Vehicle Preparation for Ground Transportation: ............................................ 25
Content Area #3: Patient Management: ................................................................................................... 28
Content Area #4: PPE Selection and IPC Related Processes: .......................................................... 32
Content Area #5: Team Configuration and Communication:.......................................................... 34
Content Area #6: Decontamination and Waste Handling: ............................................................... 35
Content Area #7: Post-Transportation Actions: ................................................................................... 37
(‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training Curriculum”) ..................................... 38

Recommendations for the future.................................................................................................... 39
Limitations ............................................................................................................................................... 42
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 43
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 44

v
List of Tables
(‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training Curriculum”)38

vi
List of Abbreviations
ASPR

Assistant Secretary for Preparendness and Response

CBRNE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear

CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

DOH

Pennsylvania Department of Health

EMS

Emergency Medical Services

EMT

Emergency Medical Technician

ER

Emergency Room

EVD

Ebola Virus Disease

HART

Hazardous Area Response Team

HCW

Health Care Worker

HEPA

High-Efficiency Particulate Air

HID

Highly Infectious Disease

IDART

Infectious Disease Ambulance Response Team

IP

Infection Prevention

IPC

Infection Prevention and Control

NBU

Nebraska Biocontainment Unit

NHTSA

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NIOSH

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NSRI

National Strategic Research Institute

OSHA

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PIU

Patient Isolation Unit

PPE

Personal Protective Equipment

SARS

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

UNMC

University of Nebraska Medical Center

WHO

World Health Organization

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel are the first line of treatment
and are the first exposed health care workers to infectious diseases (IDs).
Consequently, the EMS setting is a relatively vulnerable environment for disease
transmission and cross-contamination, keeping in mind that EMS providers may not
have the sufficient training and knowledge for managing infectious patients and
their transport. After the 2014-2016 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West
Africa, and the first transmission of EVD to health care workers in the United States,
the EMS community understandably experienced anxiety about the appropriate
education and training, as well as procedures to best handle patients with IDs
(Isakov et al., 2015). In fact, due to the increase in frequency and transmission of IDs
with high consequence, such as EVD, two counties in California, Sacramento and
Contra Costa, have developed a specialized infectious disease response team called
the Infectious Disease Ambulance Response Team (IDART), which is capable of
managing and transporting patients with communicable/infectious diseases, much
like a Hazardous Material Team (HAZMAT) would respond to a scene of a toxic spill
(Murdock, 2014).
Serious and emerging IDs, such as highly pathogenic viral hemorrhagic fevers
and novel Coronaviruses, in a time of increased globalization and travel, require
comprehensive EMS training and preparedness for efficient infection control
practices. In addition to treating the increasingly mobile populations, who
potentially have a higher likelihood of contracting an infectious or emerging disease,
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EMS personnel must decontaminate/disinfect their work equipment and
ambulances, increasing their exposure to infectious pathogens (Woodside, 2013).
The extended amount of time EMS workers spend while wearing their
personal protective equipment (PPE), can lead to fatigue, psychological stress, and
possibly tears and degradation of the PPE, which places providers at a greater risk
for contamination (Le et al., 2018). Ambulance workers must also consider what
resources they have, develop a contingency plan for isolation and/or quarantine,
manage medical waste, decide how many medics will be in the patient
compartment, choose who will provide medications, and coordinate with state
officials before transporting ID patients (CDC, Guidance for Developing a Plan for
Interfacility Transport of Persons with EVD, 2017). To effectively answer these
questions, a demanding amount of training and preparation must be done together
with an intensive program of practice in the four infection control domains: hand
hygiene, PPE selection and use, safe injections, and point of care testing prior to the
decision to transport communicable/infectious disease patients.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
collaborated with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to
conduct a study to explore the rates of EMS injuries and illnesses. Unfortunately, the
study showed that EMS providers have higher rates of fatalities and work-related
injuries than the general workforce, and that approximately 6,000 paramedics and
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) are annually exposed to harmful
substances, such as blood and respiratory secretions (Reichard, Marsh, Tonozzi,
Konda, & Gormley, 2017). The study concluded that new and enhanced efforts are
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needed to prevent the exposure of EMS personnel to harmful substances.
Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) listed “treating
patients with infectious illnesses” as one of the major job hazards EMS workers face
as part of their duties (CDC, EMS Workers, 2018).
These exposures not only put paramedics and EMTs at serious risk for
infections, but the general public as well; due to cross-contamination. Therefore, to
enhance EMS workforce safety, and to protect the public’s health, it is important to
develop, plan, identify, and facilitate the components and competencies for a
comprehensive EMS infectious disease training program. A well-defined training
program can also enhance the existing infection control practices performed by EMS
providers. For example, one study found that medics’ hands were the primary
vehicle of microbial transfer during actual EMS 911 calls, and that current practices
of decontamination minimally reduced quantity and prevalence of viral loads,
suggesting that the use of H2O2 wipes significantly reduced the concentration of
viruses on EMS surfaces (Valdes, Sexton, Lutz, & Reynolds, 2015). Such
recommendations can benefit the EMS community in implementing new and
effective strategies of infection control and equipment decontamination.
To prepare professionals, the competency based training approach has
attracted the interest of many educators around the world and became dominant in
many medical and non-medical fields over the last four decades (Frank, 2010). The
concept of competency based practice originated from paraller movements in
professional training in a number of countries, such as the National Training Board
in Australia, the National Skills Standards in the United States, and the National

4
Vocational Qualifications in England (Leung, 2002). If appropriately applied,
competency frameworks can address the gap between the theory of competency
based education and the practice of clinical teaching (Cate & Scheele, 2007).

Statement of the Problem/Context
Infection control and prevention practices of EMS providers are ongoing
issues (Jackson, Lowton, & Griffiths, 2014). Yet despite efforts and strategies to
reduce the burden of IDs, EMS workers’ practice in dealing with communicable
diseases is still reported as suboptimal due to poor knowledge of fundamental
principles of infection control and disease transmission, as well as decreased
compliance with standard precautions and equipment disinfection
recommendations (Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017; Bledsoe et al., 2014; Harris &
Nicolai, 2010; Shaban, 2006; Shaban, Creedy, & Clark, 2003).
An infection control training module, specific to EMS, needs to be developed
together with a competency set for IDs and infection control procedures for the EMS
community in the prehospital field (Lowe et al., 2015; Mahomed, Jinabhai, Taylor, &
Yancey, 2007). Strengthening EMS training and education on Highly Infectious
Diseases (HIDs) could improve patient outcomes, responders’ safety, and the
community’s health (Le et al., 2018).
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Significance of Study/Project
To our knowledge, no study has yet developed a training set specific to the
EMS community for transporting HID patients. The purpose of this project is to
describe the process of identifying the need for an EMS-HID transport training
program and to gather best practices on procedures for the EMS transport of
patients with HID.
The results of this project will be valuable to: practitioners in the field of
EMS, public health agencies, hospitals, and training facilities in developing better
practices and tools for EMS-HID training programs. The outcomes of this work
can enhance the occupational safety of EMS personnel by minimizing their
exposure to infectious agents through a well-defined EMS-HID training set;
improve patient outcomes; and eventually improve the community’s health.

Research Question
This project investigates the components of an EMS-HID training program
that can increase the knowledge and practice of paramedics and EMTs who may
respond to patients with highly communicable/infectious illnesses. The overall
objective of the project is to gather current practices, identify best practices, and
finally develop an EMS-HID training set for the prehospital community.

6

Specific Aims
1. The overall objective for this project is to gather best practices on procedures
for the transport of patients with HID.
2. Identify areas of consensus and gaps in EMS-HID practice.
3. Develop broad program educational skills to train prehospital providers who
may potentially transport a HID patient.
To achieve the overall aim, the author will be providing a comprehensive
review of sources related to HID training for EMS providers. And specify best
practices, from national and international EMS-HID experts, in regards to
transporting patients with communicable/infectious diseases.

Definitions of Terms
The term being defined is in Bold:
1. Competency: The knowledge, skills, and abilities demonstrated by
organization or system members needed to perform specific functions within
organizations or professional practice (Birkhead, Davies, Miner, Lemmings &
Koo, 2008).
2. Emergency Medical Services (EMS): The NHTSA’s Office of EMS defines
EMS as a system that provides emergency medical care. Once it is activated
by an incident that causes serious illness or injury, the focus of EMS is
emergency medical care of the patient(s) (2019).
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3. Emergency Medical Technician (EMT): Stanford Medicine, EMT Program
defines EMT as an emergency responder trained to provide medical care.
“EMTs may be solely responsible for the treatment and transportation of
their patients or assist a paramedic, nurse, physician or other advanced life
support provider” (2019).
4. Infectious Disease (ID): According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such
as bacteria, viruses, parasites, or fungi. The diseases can spread directly or
indirectly from one person to another (2019). In this document, HIDs refer to
highly hazardous communicable disease, high consequence infectious
diseases, and/or high consequence communicable diseases.
5. Paramedic: The Department of Labor defines a paramedic as a person who
responds to emergency calls, performing medical services, and transporting
patients to medical facilities (2019).
6. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): According to the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), PPE include equipment for eyes,
face, head, extremities, respiratory devices, and protective shields;
depending on the nature of the incident (2019).
7. Standard precautions: Standard precautions are disease transmission

prevention strategies recommended by both the CDC & WHO, and are
available online for public access.
https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/basics/standard-precautions.html
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Assumptions
1. The EMS workgroup participating organizations are willing to engage and
share their experiences that are related to the training of EMS and the safe
transport of HID patients.
2. The participating organizations have experienced, or will experience,
training EMS on transporting patients with highly communicable/infectious
illnesses.
3. The EMS Workgroup participants are willing to share resources, such as data,
recommendations, past experiences, that are beneficial to training EMS
providers on handling and transporting HID patients.
4. The EMS Workgroup participants are EMS representatives from national and
internation organizations.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW:
This section will be divided into: literature of EMS transport of HIDs and literature
of educational competency development.

1. Literature of EMS Transport of Patients with HIDs:
Prehospital personnel may be exposed to infections and body fluids of their
patients due to the unpredictable nature of their job and the uncontrolled
environment, as it is not always possible to predict which patient has a
communicable disease (Speers, 2014). In fact, the effects of the stressful nature of
EMS work has led to paramedicine being among the most dangerous careers
(Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017). However, to minimize the risk of
contamination, standard precautions and PPE must be practiced, and PPE worn, at
all times, together with appropriate immunization, continued education, and post
exposure counselling of EMS staff (Speers, 2014).
Prehospital providers experience significant exposure to blood and body
fluids, but at the same time, EMS workers are not consistently utilizing standard
precautions and equipment disinfection recommendations, which is due to poor
knowledge of fundamental principles of infection control and disease transmission
(Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017; Bledsoe et al., 2014; Harris & Nicolai, 2010;
Shaban, 2006; Shaban, Creedy, & Clark, 2003); including failure to wear gloves
(17%) and the inappropriate disposal of contaminated materials (79%) (Harris &
Nicolai, 2010).
Despite these shortcomings, two studies reported the exposure rates to IDs
in the U.S. among paramedics who work in a similar ambulance service company.
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Both showed a decrease from 4.4 exposures per 1,000 EMS calls to 1.2 exposures
per 1,000 EMS calls between 1993 and 2011, which is attributed to continued
education and training on the appropriate use of PPE and infection control
measures (Sayed, Kue, McNeil, & Dyer, 2011; Reed, Daya, Jui, Grellman, & Loveless,
1993).
During the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in
Canada, 68 paramedics developed SARS, and 292 medics were placed on either
home quarantine or work quarantine, which was due to the medics’ unprotected
exposure (not wearing the appropriate PPE) to health care facilities that
experienced a SARS outbreak (Verbeek, McClelland, Silverman, & Burgess, 2004).
Those who developed SARS did not use appropriate PPE, and four out of five
paramedics initiated patient contact before being directed to wear their PPE
(Verbeek et al., 2004).
Another study examined paramedics’ exposure to various infectious disease
hazards and found that they were most commonly exposed to meningitis (32.9%),
followed by tuberculosis, viral respiratory infections, and body fluid splashes to skin
and eyes; suggesting the use of protective eyewear to minimize the risk of body fluid
splashes (Sayed, Kue, McNeil, & Dyer, 2011).
A qualitative study assessed the retention of donning and doffing of Level C
(chemical-resistant coverall, butyl gloves, boots, and an air-purifying respirator)
PPE skills among paramedics who received Level C PPE training six months ago at
the University of Pittsburg. The study found that only 14.3% of medics successfully
donned and doffed (suggesting that the current training is inadequate) without
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committing a critical error, such as early removal of the respirator, with the most
common non-critical error involving the removal of boots before other parts of the
PPE ensemble (Northington, Mahoney, Hahn, Suyama, & Hostler, 2007). This study
used a standardized training module and checklist adopted from a disaster medicine
course taught at the University of Pittsburg as an evaluation tool for the paramedic’s
performance.
A survey by Visentin et al., assessed the use of PPE among EMS personnel
during ID outbreak and non-outbreak situations, and found that the most common
reasons for inconsistent donning of PPE were: judgment of non-necessity by the
medics, and technical difficulties wearing the PPE (e.g., visual impairment while
wearing protective eyewear) (2009). Another survey conducted on the EMS
personnel in Summit County, Ohio indicated that medics need continued education
focusing on the routes of transmission of IDs, their risk of contamination, and the
effective use of protective gear. These results were due to the medics’ lack of
knowledge of diseases’ routes of transmission, and the non-compliance with
standard precautions (Mencl, Birkle, Blanda, & Gerson, 2000).
A most recent qualitative study examining EMS providers perspectives at one
of the designated U.S. Ebola Centers showed that current EMS-ID training sessions
were mostly focused on PPE, but neglected the basic knowledge of HID
transmission, resulting in lack of confidence and feeling of danger among EMS
practitioners during actual responses (Alexander, Masters, & Warren, 2020). The
study concluded by stating that some of these concerns may be mitigated by
providing continuous pandemic preparedness and training to EMS personnel.
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A gap analysis survey of EMS practitioners’ assessment of needs when
transporting patients with HIDs highlighted the lack of consistent guidelines and
training for prehospital personnel, and that EMS workers have limited time in their
national curricula devoted to the identification of IDs and infection control practices
(Le et al., 2018). At the end of this survey, respondents were asked to provide
opinions. These included the need for a more quality training of IDs and not feeling
confident enough to respond to HID patients.
Lowe et al., (2015) identified several considerations for the safe EMS
transport of patients infected with EVD. Based on their analysis, they recommend:
ambulance preparation (including stripping the ambulance patient care cabin of all
equipment that is not required for transport, draping the patient compartment with
6-mm plastic sheeting secured with duct tape, and isolating the driver’s
compartment from the patient’s), appropriate selection of PPE, and post
transport/environmental decontamination.
Isakov et al., (2015) identified collaboration between EMS and the receiving
hospitals as one component to fill educational and training gaps related to
transporting patients with EVD, as well as teaching medics how to prepare the
ambulance in advance to facilitate cleaning and decontamination. Isakov et al.,
(2015) also recommended that the ventilation system in the driver’s compartment
to be turned on with the fan set to high, without recirculation, to create a positive
pressure area and to prevent from aerosols entering the compartment. They also
noted that the Tyvek suit and hooded, powered, air-purifying respirator provided
suitable splash protection, prevented medics from incautious touching of the face,
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and did not cause eyewear fogging. As to ambulance waste after the transport of an
ID patient, EMS staff PPE and any other waste from the ambulances transporting
EVD patients at the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit (NBU) were bagged, secured, and
passed to health care workers at the NBU to be placed in an autoclave (Lowe et al.,
2015).
The United States Fire Administration listed the components of an infection
control training program, which included: epidemiology, proper use of PPE,
standard operating procedures for safe work practices, proper disposal of medical
waste, cleaning and decontamination, exposure management, and vehicle/supply
preparation (Guide to Managing an Emergency Service Infection Control Program,
2002).
Additionally, the Washington State Department of Health’s Manual, Infectious
Disease Prevention for EMS Providers, gives a detailed explanation on the proper
techniques of managing an ID patient in the field (2009). The CDC, together with the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), also created guidance
for developing a plan for interfacility transport of persons under investigation or
confirmed patients with EVD in the United States (2017).
Another study demonstrated the spread of microbes during actual EMS calls.
The study found that medics’ hands were the primary vehicle of microbial transfer
(Valdes, Sexton, Lutz, & Reynolds, 2015). The study also found that current practices
of decontamination minimally reduced quantity and prevalence of viral loads,
suggesting that the use of H2O2 wipes significantly reduced the concentration of
viruses on EMS surfaces, and that additional training on decontamination and hand
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hygiene must be provided to the EMS personnel. The Pennsylvania Department of
Health (DOH) recently recommended that ambulances be taken out of service for at
least two hours after transporting measles patients - because measles virus can
contaminate surfaces or hang in the air for up to two hours (DOH, 2019).
One observational study highlighted the use of standard precautions by EMS
providers arriving at a large emergency department (ER). The study indicated the
following: only 56.9% of medics arrived wearing gloves; hand washing was
observed in only 27.8% of providers; equipment disinfection was noted in 31.6%,
with the most commonly disinfected item being the patient stretcher (Bledsoe et al.,
2014). Another observational study examined EMS personnel commitment to the
four infection control domains: hand hygiene, PPE selection and use, safe injections,
and point of care testing. The study found that only 50% of the EMS providers
performed hand hygiene (County of Los Angeles Public Health, Communicable
Disease Control, 2016).
The risk of communicable disease is not as obvious as other physical risks to
the EMS personnel, such as road traffic and power line accidents, and therefore, EMS
providers must receive a training that enables them to identify at-risk patients and
the appropriate level of PPE (MacDonald, 2014). The risk assessment begins with
screening questions and information obtained from the dispatch communication
center, prior to making patient contact (MacDonald, 2014). These screening
questions can include asking the caller for their present symptoms or if there is
anyone else who is also sick at the callers’ location (EMS Infectious Disease
Playbook, 2017).
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In some parts of Europe, there are specifically designed ambulances for the
transport of patients with infectious diseases and are operated by the Hazardous
Area Response Team (HART) paramedics (Schilling et al., 2013). The specific
technical features on board these vehicles include controlled ventilation, negative
pressure, HEPA filtration, aerosol tight systems, fixed equipment and walls that can
be easily disinfected, and separation of driver’s from patient’s cabin (Schilling et al.,
2013).
To conclude this section:
A preliminary literature review shows that past studies are primarily focused
on the weaknesses of EMS management of patients with HIDs. What is missing from
the past studies is a comprehensive and structured approach for developing
competencies to train EMS providers on the safe transport of patients with IDs.
Specifically, prehospital personnel need a training module that focuses on:
identifying at-risk patients before making patient contact, compliance with standard
precautions, modes of transmission of IDs, appropriate selection of PPE, donning
and doffing procedures, ambulance preparation, decontamination of the vehicle and
its equipment, and medical waste management.

2. Literature on Educational Competency Development
There are eight competency areas included in the Core Competencies for
public health professionals developed by the Public Health Foundation (PHF) and
Council on Linkages between Academia and Public Health Practice (COL), which
apply to all public health specialists including paramedics (Birkhead, Davies, Miner,
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Lemmings & Koo, 2008). The competency domains of public health practice are:
analytic/assessment, policy development and program planning, communication,
cultural competency, community dimensions of practice, public health sciences,
financial planning and management, and leadership and systems thinking, with each
domain having at least one primary competency statement (PHF, 2014). The
competencies can serve to define knowledge gaps that can lead to the development
of a specific training plan (Birkhead, Davies, Miner, Lemmings & Koo, 2008). The
COL’s competencies have served as a framework to build public health-relevant
competency sets, such as public health preparedness and applied epidemiology
(Koo & Miner, 2010).
Koo & Miner (2010) recommended a framework for workforce education in
public health by targeting three conceptual approaches: adult learning theory,
competency-based education, and the Dreyfus model in public health. Adult learning
theory includes letting the adult learner know why they are learning, what the goal
is, and whether they can achieve it, and is useful in preparation of the learning
environment and engaging the learner in the appropriate types of learning
activities. The theory of competency-based education as explained by Koo & Miner
(2010) is based on the eight competency domains of the PHF, COL. The Dreyfus
model in public health provides key guidance for selecting the suitable skill level for
the different learners and focuses on longer-term career outcomes (Koo & Miner,
2010). The integration of the three concepts can produce high-quality workforce
education.
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The National Center for Environmental Health, within the CDC, has published
recommendations for local environmental health practitioners; these include 14
core competencies grouped into three primary functions: assessment, management,
and communication (2001). Assessment involves conducting a literature search and
consulting with experts in the field. Management involves clearly articulating a
problem and taking appropriate measures to resolve it. Communication involves
effectively identifying “teaching moments” and emphasizing prevention (National
Center for Environmental Health, CDC, 2001).
The Association for Professionals in Infection Control (APIC) and
Epidemiology developed a conceptual model of Infection Prevention (IP)
Competency that could be applicable in all practice settings (Murphy et al., 2012).
The four domains identified by APIC represent a future-oriented competency
development: leadership, infection prevention and control, technology, and
performance improvement, which are described in detail in this reference (Murphy
et al., 2012). The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC)
has also identified core competencies for IP, which included the identification of ID
processes, controlling the transmission of infectious agents, and education and
research (2012). The Journal of Infection Prevention has also published 17
competencies to design a well-structured education and training program specific to
IP, which includes: clinical practice, education, research, and leadership and
management (Burnett, 2011).
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION METHODS:
The methods for this project were done in two phases. In the first stage we
conducted a literature review to outline current practices. In the second stage, we
convened an EMS-ID Workgroup Meeting that included national experts from ASPR,
NDMS, and CDC, as well as international HID experts, with an overall objective of
identifying best practices. Finally, inputs and comments were collected using the
Sphere Software.
The overall objective of the literature search was to identify
agreement/disagreement areas between what is available from the literature and
was discussed in the EMS-ID Workgroup Meeting. We reviewed the EMS ID
literature available on Google Scholar and PubMed online databases using the
search queries: EMS, paramedic, EMT, prehospital, MEDEVAC, ambulance,
prevention, PPE, infectious disease, communicable disease, contagious, outbreak,
containment of biohazards, and infection control, limited to the English language.
These queries yielded 18 unique citations, which were imported into an electronic
database (RefWorks).
Additionally, manually reviewed citations from related articles generated
seven more sources. We included original, peer-reviewed articles evaluating EMS
capability, weaknesses, and recommendations for the transport of patients with IDs.
Articles were excluded if the sample population did not include paramedics, EMTs,
or prehospital physicians and/or nurses, which required full-text review.
In the second stage of this project, we convened an EMS-ID Workgroup
Meeting (held in Baltimore, MD, January 2020). The purpose of this meeting was to
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gather national and international experts to provide input to the University of
Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) to facilitate the development of an EMS-ID
training curriculum. A total of 25 national and international EMS-ID organizations,
along with CDC and ASPR officials, gathered to discuss best practices and work on
answering common EMS-HID problematic areas. The meeting was organized by
UNMC and the National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI). No attempt was made to
identify the credentials of the attendees nor their professional backgrounds. This
strategy was used to ensure that each member was equally represented and to
promote open discussion among all participants. Discussion was open to achieve an
overall objective of sharing knowledge and identifying consensus around the
following pre-identified content areas:

Content Areas:
1- Special equipment preparation
2- Vehicle preparation for ground transportation
3- Patient management
4- Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) practice, including PPE-related
processes
5- Team configuration and communication
6- Hygiene, decontamination, and waste management
7- Post-transportation personnel management and monitoring
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Finally, we solicited inputs and comments from practicing ID experts and 25
national and international organizations representing EMS using the Sphere
Software. It is a platform designed for this type of collaboration meetings where
data can be gathered simultaneously from multiple parties without disrupting the
process. Participants were able to type their thoughts and questions without
interrupting the presenter. The presenter (or any of the attendees) can then answer
the questions and respond to the typed comments. Participants were introduced to
the system before the start of the workshop.
Verbal comments and questions (that were not typed) were entered into the
system by two notetakers. Here, we present the results of those discussions,
highlighting the EMS Workgroup perspectives and noting areas where agreement
could not be reached, followed by a summary of what should be incorporated into
an EMS-ID training program (‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training
Curriculum”).

Sample Population:
The primary research method for this project is literature review and
conceptual modeling. One EMS-HID expert workshop in Baltimore, MD will be
assembled to identify current and best practices to transport patients with HIDs.
The workshop participants (the EMS Workgroup) are national and international
experts in the field of EMS and IDs. Inputs and comments will be solicited from
participating organizations representing EMS and the transport of HID patients. The
number of participating organizations is approximately 25 agencies from Korea,
Japan, Singapore, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as
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representatives from the CDC, ASPR, John Hopkins, NIH, Emory University, Indiana
University, UNMC, and Omaha Fire Department.

Timelines:
Date

Task

October 10th

Final proposal submission

October 21st

Schedualing comprehensive exam on Seguidor

Week of October

Start writing the first section of the Thesis

21st
January of 2020)

Collecting data from the EMS-HID Workgroup participants
together with conducting a literature/resource search to
gather and determine best EMS-HID practices

January-March

Completing all sections of the thesis project
Finish the reference page
Proofread, refine, edit, before submission

March 20th

Submission of the final paper to Dr. Sharon Medcalf

April 6th

Submission of the paper to the Thesis committee

April 15th

Final Thesis presentation

Data Analysis:
The author analyzed data generated internally using simple statistics (e.g.,
percentages, averages, and frequency). Also, because the project’s data is mainly
composed of current observations, knowledge, recommendations, there was no
need for complex numerical data analysis.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Content Area #1: Special Equipment Preparation:
As noted earlier, patient movement and biocontainment are among the most
challenging tasks prehospital providers encounter when transporting patients with
HIDs. It is crucial for EMS providers to plan and exercise the types of patient
isolation systems used to transport special patients. The two isolation transport
units discussed as measures to implement infection control were the ISOPOD and
the EpiShuttle (developed after the 2014 EVD outbreak). Both units share the same
indications of use - to contain the pathogens and decrease the risk of crosscontamination.
In this section of the workshop, we discussed the similarities and differences
between the two isolators. Both Patient Isolation Units (PIUs) provide a negative
pressure environment but require training prior to usage. The two PIUs provide
access to the patient through the incorporated access ports (e.g., glove ports and
ventilation ports), and thus, both are vulnerable to damage and, possibly, leakage of
fluids. Also, fogging and decreased visibility through the transparent surface of the
EpiShuttle was a special issue noted by the workgroup. Nevertheless, few
participants encouraged the idea of using anti-fog products to enhance visibility.
Our working group highlighted one major difference between the two PIUs - the
adjustable internal stretcher of the EpiShuttle - which could improve patient
experience and comfort during transport.
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The EpiShuttle was also noted to have protective outer layers, allowing the
unit to be re-used for up to five years or 20 uses (whichever comes first).
Additionally, the EpiShuttle was acknowledged because it allowed for a reduction in
the level of PPE required to implement IPC (since the patient is fully encapsulated),
and therefore, lowered the risk of generated hazardous waste and offered an
opportunity for a longer duration of travel (without change of caregivers).
A significant limitation of the EpiShuttle was the size configuration.
Larger/taller patients would not fit into the unit, and thus, the EpiShuttle was not
seen by the workgroup as practical as the ISOPOD. It also required individual
adapters to be secured to the ambulance stretcher, which may not always be
available for rapid deployment. Because there were many differences between the
two, using an ISOPOD versus the Epishuttle was one area where participants could
not reach an agreement. However, we all stressed the need for EMS agencies to
clearly define when/when not to use a PIU in their protocols and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs). If there is a risk for exposure to bodily fluids, the
workgroup recommended using a PIU. But if the patient is “dry” or “stable”, he/she
may not need to be placed in a PIU.
Many of our working group emphasized the importance of pre-positioning
several patient care items inside the PIU for potential use during transport. These
items included emesis bags; a marker board to ease communication or disposable
walkie-talkies utilized for patient communication; ventilation devices; and a
dedicated intravenous medication line to push medications as needed (e.g.,
sedatives, antiemetics, etc.). Further discussion on patient management techniques
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will be outlined in the next sections. In addition to the ambulance’s medical
equipment, it was acknowledged that having additional hazardous waste bags, leakproof containers, and impermeable sheets inside the patient care area may be useful
for unstable patients who may produce excessive bodily fluids.
In addition to using a Bluetooth earpiece with a push-to-talk button or
hands-free radios, a few of the group members proposed the idea of providing
cooling vests for the EMS crew to provide comfort while performing patient
transport in full PPE. Lastly, wearing external rubber boots was recognized by the
workgroup to minimize slip hazards, especially during severe weather conditions.
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Content Area #2: Vehicle Preparation for Ground
Transportation:
The discussion started by acknowledging that, in case the patient’s condition
deteriorates (i.e., loss of consciousness) diversion from the receiving facility is not
an option because the receiving hospital is prepared for the patient, whereas any
other receiving facility may not be prepared with high level infection prevention
mitigation processes or environments. Therefore, the transport unit must be
sufficiently equipped and ready to provide safe, acute patient care (i.e., ventilatory
support, cardiac monitoring, and medication infusion) until reaching its final
destination.
The participants concurred with Lowe et al (2014) that the patient cabin
should be draped with 6-mm plastic sheeting cut in a “U” shape and secured with
Gorilla or duct tape. The process of draping an ambulance takes approximately one
hour for two experienced personnel, and therefore, early notification should be
practiced. Our working group also encouraged the use of the commercially available
6-mm plastic tarp designed for ambulance protection, which minimizes installation
time to approximately 20 minutes.
While others still draped the back of the ambulance when using a PIU, many
of the workgroup participants felt that draping the back of the ambulance when
using a PIU is not necessary. The idea behind draping the patient compartment
when using a PIU is to guard against unrecognized external contamination of the
PIU. Nevertheless, the considerable majority agreed that the team who installed the
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tarp/plastic draping should be the same team to remove and decontaminate the
draping. That is because the installation team knows where the seams and tabs on
tape and tarp/plastic draping are, thus minimizing the risk of potential
unrecognized hazards.
As to the environmental modifications and HVAC control, the workgroup
perspectives concurred with previous studies that the patient cabin must be
isolated from the driver compartment; vent system in the driver compartment
should be set to high without recirculation; and exhaust fan in the patient cabin is
set to high (Kumar & Isakov, 2018). It was also acknowledged that lowering the
cabin temperature for febrile patients may be helpful.
The participants discussed safety considerations for draping a standard
ambulance and noted that including the following safety features may be necessary
for future transports: seatbelt access; positive pressure air vents uncovered;
painter’s drop cloth or impermeable sheets to minimize slip hazard; and
communication devices with external personnel. Using impermeable/impervious
drapes over plastic was noted to be not as slippery as plastic and provided extra
traction for the caregivers when wearing external rubber boots. Also,
impermeable/impervious drapes did not require scissors or sharps when removed
from the back of the ambulance and was semi-absorbent for patients experiencing
diarrhea or vomiting. It is advised that applying these environmental modifications
be supervised and conducted with the presence of a safety officer.
Some of our working group participants agreed that all medical equipment
(e.g., cardiac monitor and suction unit) should be inside the patient cabin and
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accessible but not exposed to contamination. Others felt for the need to remove all
unessential equipment to a secondary transport/chase vehicle. Some participants
felt that having pre-drawn medications secured/taped to the inside wall of the
patient cabin may be helpful and can ease treatment procedures during transport
(e.g., nausea), but the majority preferred to pre-treat patients before transport.
Many of our international participants did not express interest in conducting
the above mentioned environmental modifications to a standard ambulance.
Instead, they preferred using a dedicated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
(CBRN) ambulance equipped with controlled ventilation; negative pressure; HEPA
filtration; separated driver compartment; and intercommunication systems.
Nonetheless, we all agreed that it is a preferred practice to arrange with nearby EMS
agencies to stage additional ambulances as backup units, loaded with extra supplies
and a PPE-capable team. A summary of additional special equipment considerations
has been published elsewhere (EMS Infectious Disease Playbook, 2017).
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Content Area #3: Patient Management:
This section highlights two goals: 1. Patient safety 2. Protection of EMS crew.
The overall objective is to provide quality patient care while balancing the needs of
the patient with the safety of the crew.

1. Patient Preparation:
Depending on the patient’s condition, status, and signs and symptoms, some
of our working group advised putting the adult patient in PPE (surgical mask, gown,
impervious suit/sheet, undergarment, etc.) while being transported in a PIU. This is
especially useful in the back of the ambulance, where close quarters cannot be
avoided. The thought behind putting the patient in PPE inside a PIU is to arrest the
spread of pathogens. The participants explained that having the patient wear the
appropriate PPE may be useful in the event of a breach; needing to access the
patient in PIU during transport; or in case of a PIU failure (e.g., HEPA blower failure
requiring the need to open PIU). We advocate that EMS agencies anticipating the
transport of patients with IDs to have written protocols addressing the issue of
opening a PIU during transport.
The workgroup further discussed whether patients should wear N95
respirators or surgical masks. They concurred with Balazy and colleagues that
surgical masks are adequate and that they are primarily designed to protect the
environment from the wearer, whereas N95 respirators are intended to protect the
wearer from the environment (2006). Nevertheless, we encourage establishing
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early communication with the sending facility regarding patient preparation
procedures.
The workgroup recommended that the team who packages the patient inside
the portable isolator (using a verified packaging checklist) should not be the one to
clean the outer surface of the PIU - to mitigate the threat of unrecognized
contamination on the outside of the PIU. Although this practice may not be possible
in the EMS setting and will require more personnel in PPE, every exposed EMS
provider should be monitored following patient contact. If there is a limited number
of providers, a change of gloves between packaging and cleaning must be done.
Finally, our working group highlighted the importance of not allowing passengers,
family members, or personal belongings in the sterilized driver compartment to
prevent potential hazards or possible cross-contamination.

2. Treatment Considerations:
This section depends on whether the transport team is a Basic Life Support,
Advanced Life Support, or a Critical Care Transport crew. Nevertheless, the
workgroup reasoned that managing HID patients without understanding the
epidemiology of the disease may produce fear and anxiety. In fact, understanding
the nature of the illness helps Healthcare Workers (HCWs) recognize how to
interrupt transmission, prevent cross-contamination, and decrease hesitancy and
reluctance when caring for highly hazardous patients (Alexander, Masters, &
Warren, 2020).
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Pre-determining all patient care interventions was acknowledged to be a
critical factor in achieving successful transport. Many of our participants
encouraged the following: limiting the number of exposed providers; pre-treating
for symptoms; limiting sharps; and limiting aerosol producing procedures (e.g.,
airway suctioning). Airway management and invasive procedures should be done
before transport. We acknowledged that, if using a PIU, EMS providers could
consider using blind airway insertion devices, such as King airway, rather than
intubation. It is also best if diarrhea and vomiting can be controlled with
pharmaceuticals prior to transport. When anticipating longer transport tasks, the
working group noted the need to coordinate with the sending facility to place a
Foley catheter to drain urine, especially when providing fluid therapy, as this is
normally outside of EMS scope of practice.
In the case of clinical deterioration resulting in death during transport, the
workgroup noted that prolonged Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) might not
be possible. If so, the EMS crew will need to rapidly identify reversible causes of
arrest and obtain more respondents in full PPE. The presence of additional
providers in this confined setting may lead to infection control breaches and an
increased risk of cross-contamination. For all of these reasons, and to protect the
safety of the providers, the working group did not encourage CPR while en route to
a receiving facility. However, this is highly dependent on the patient’s condition,
presenting symptoms, types of PPE, and length of transport time. Such intensive
clinical care protocols (CPR, intubation, etc.) should involve the ethics principle and
be planned with ID experts (Komar & Isakov, 2018).
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3. Patient Hand-Off (Transfer of Care):
There was agreement that receiving hospitals should plan a secure
(preferably indoor, climate-controlled) ambulance bay. It is best if the transfer of
care site is spacious to permit multiple vehicles access, with clear separation of
clean and dirty zones, to allow for ambulance decontamination and PPE doffing
(discussed in the next sections). The site should also be equipped with bathroom
facilities and running water.
The medic unit driver, or a member of the receiving facility, will open the
back door and help remove the patient from the ambulance, but stay at the foot of
the stretcher. The workgroup reasoned that opening and closing doors should not
be done by any of the EMS caregivers due to contamination risk. Afterward, the
medic driver should take the ambulance to the pre-determined location for
decontamination, where he/she will doff PPE with the assistance of a trained
observer using a verified PPE doffing checklist.
If paramedics help transfer the patient to the hospital bed, they will secure
the stretcher and any used/exposed equipment for decontamination. Providers who
assisted hospital staff with patient movement will perform PPE doffing inside the
facility’s decontamination area. All patient personal items are handled as
contaminated items until autoclaved or chemically decontaminated to be returned
to the patient.
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Content Area #4: PPE Selection and IPC Related Processes:
The selection of the appropriate protective gear should be constructed based
on a case-by-case analysis, transmission-based precautions (contact, droplet,
aerosol), and in accordance with the CDC guidelines and recommendations. The
workgroup noticed that the two goals when donning/doffing protective gear are the
use of a proven checklist with the presence of a trained observer and frequent
training of providers on competencies to use PPE ensembles. Many of our
participants recommended that for caregivers, it may be necessary to wear
impermeable gowns or coveralls; triple-layer gloves; boot covers; apron; full-face
shield; and N95 respirators or Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPR). A few of
our international participants recommended using a fully encapsulating single piece
suit with welded gloves and sock feet (Respirex FloPod TM Suit) with a two-way
radio. The workgroup acknowledged the possibility of applying anti-fog products on
face screens to enhance visibility.
We recognized that if the driver compartment is isolated, it is a redundant
precaution for the medic driver to wear a N95 respirator, but consistent with the
CDC guidelines issued for the transport of patients with SARS (CDC, SARS Guidance
for EMS, 2004) - keeping in mind that there may be unrecognized mixing of air
between the patient’s and driver’s compartments in some ambulance designs.
The participants also discussed the important of considering how long EMS
providers are allowed in PPE while in the back of the ambulance. If prolonged
transport is anticipated, there should be a designated, secured respite site where
providers can switch roles and doff their PPE - planning with environmental
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services and law enforcement is key. Also, when we discussed the respective
maximum time limit in PPE, we agreed that it is subjected to personal tolerance; the
level type of PPE; environmental conditions; physical fitness; work demand; and
battery life of the blower unit. Most agreed that two to three hours is sufficient for
providers to be in PPE, but no longer than safe and effective IPC practice
(accommodating for patient loading and unloading times).
Lastly, most of our group participants rely on safety officers to monitor staff
in PPE and the overall performance (may not be possible unless a safety officer
travels with the team). And we noted that aside from training HCWs, it may be
necessary to train other personnel and non-medical crew on PPE donning and
doffing. This can include security officers and sanitation workers.
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Content Area #5: Team Configuration and Communication:
It is expected that the transport operation will be supported by an incident
command structure with a dedicated safety officer and a backup unit/secondary
transport team carrying extra supplies. We agreed that best practice is to limit the
number of exposed providers as reasonably possible. This, however, depends on the
patient’s condition and needs. Our working group indicated that, when using a PIU, a
member of the hospital/biocontainment staff can assist with the PIU processes and
ride with the ambulance crew. As to roles and responsibilities, we acknowledged
that the medic driver will not make any patient contact but will assist the crew with
opening and closing doors. The driver will be isolated from the patient compartment
and will be wearing a coverall, N95 respirator, and goggles without wearing hooded
PAPR and hazmat boots as this might not be safe to operate a vehicle. Also, private
Radio channels are preferred to prevent from interruptions and/or the available
radio scanning applications.
The number of providers inside the patient compartment varies based on
several factors, including whether the patient is ambulatory or not, and whether
he/she needs ventilatory support. Nonetheless, in addition to the medic driver, most
agreed that having two paramedics in full PPE with communication devices installed
inside the coverall (preferred disposable walkie-talkies) is sufficient. But if
necessary, a specialty provider (e.g., peds/neo) can join the EMS team to provide
further care. A supervisor and a safety officer - ready to be deployed in full PPE- are
encouraged to travel with the crew to monitor the overall performance and IPC
requirements. Additionally, in case of an emergency stop, the chase/secondary
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vehicle may carry other supplies, such as water coolers, tables for equipment, and
tent. Lastly, it may be required to coordinate with environmental services and law
enforcement to establish secured respite sites where a change of crew (for
prolonged transports) can occur.

Content Area #6: Decontamination and Waste Handling:
In this section, we first discussed the nature of the location in which the
disinfection/decontamination will occur. We agreed that the transfer of care
location within a hospital should be spacious to allow for multiple vehicles and to
accommodate PPE doffing zones (with clear separation of clean and dirty areas). In
this site, wipe down of vehicle, equipment, and the collection of biomedical waste
will take place, keeping in mind that hazardous waste is highly regulated Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR, 49 C.F.R., Parts 171-180). Also, having an
indoor location is preferred because it can offer protection against weather
elements and secure from bystanders and media.
We acknowledged that visibly soiled surfaces must first be decontaminated
using an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered disinfectant following
the directions on the label. Used/exposed medical equipment and high touch
surfaces (e.g., door handles) must also be decontaminated. Generated waste,
including clothes worn under PPE, should be packaged in autoclave bags and bins
and transported for autoclave/disposal facility. Our working group did not
recommend using disinfectant sprays because it is an aerosol producing procedure.
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Once all tape/wire ties have been cut, plastic draping inside the patient
compartment can be folded in on itself and disposed of as hazardous waste. Finally,
depending on the size of the autoclave, the ISOPOD can be cut down and autoclaved
at the receiving facility - keeping in mind that best practice may be to partner with
the receiving hospital or a specialized company to handle the waste.
After wiping down the entire ambulance with an EPA registered disinfectant,
many of our working group suggested using vaporized hydrogen peroxide
disinfection (Bioquell) for vehicle decontamination. And while others preferred
applying Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation (UVGI) light, few recommended using
gaseous Chlorine dioxide. Recent studies have shown that using UVGI in multiple
locations can effectively reduce microbial contamination and mitigate
decontamination concerns (Lindsley et al., 2018).

37

Content Area #7: Post-Transportation Actions:
We highlighted the importance of post-mission surveillance following the
successful transport of HID patients. The workgroup noted that, in addition to being
monitored for signs and symptoms of the disease for the incubation period and
general wellbeing, it might be necessary to provide mental health resources to the
EMS team following patient transport. We recommend using the NIOSH Emergency
Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance Framework to ensure the safety of
the crew before, during, and following transport. Finally, the receiving facility
should update the transport agency with regards to confirmatory patient testing, as
this may impact post-mission medical surveillance.

38

(‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training Curriculum”)
Education
Identification of HID processes
o Incubation
o Signs and symptoms
o Modes of transmission and prevention
o Available vaccine/prophylaxis
Infection prevention and control procedures
o Hand and glove hygiene concepts
o PPE selection
o PPE donning and doffing technique
o Indication for the use of a portable isolator
o Principles of isolation and quarantine
o Cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization of PIU, vehicle, and reusable PPE
o PPE breach and biohazard spill
o Liquid and solid waste management
Vehicle and Special Equipment Preparation
o Desired PIU
o Environmental modifications and cabin draping procedures
o Team communication strategies and devices
o Pre-positioning the desired patient care equipment
Patient Management
o Team configuration and composition
o Patient preparation and placement
o En route clinical care guidelines
o Physical and psychological considerations
o Transfer of care processes
Post-Transportation Actions
o Debriefing
o Post-mission medical surveillance
o Continuing education

39

Recommendations for the future
Given infrastructural and knowledge gaps in the field of EMS transport of
patients with HIDs, there is an urgent need to establish an evidence-based hands-on
EMS training curriculum. Our working group agreed that current training practices
tend to be based on history, tradition, and past responses and not real scientific
evidence to support a solid best practice. Therefore, future research and pilot
projects could help us identify the effectiveness of EMS-HID training programs and
whether there are additional gaps to be covered.
Based on the workgroup discussions, we recommend having a network of ID
specialists experienced with portable isolators to review, define, and recommend
features that can be used by EMS agencies to set standards and protocols. Those ID
specialists experienced with portable isolators could clearly define whether dry and
stable patients need to be placed in a PIU and whether there are safer options for
unstable patients that allow for direct patient contact and interventions, such as
draping an ambulance and holding the use of portable isolators. Our working group
highlighted the issue of opening a portable isolator during transport (for emergency
interventions) and noted that current protocols do not address this issue. Thus,
future research should tackle the topic of opening a PIU during transport and
evaluate its impact on patients and crew safety.
Pediatric transport was another area identified by the workgroup as a gap.
Future research could help us identify the use of portable isolators when
transporting infants/children/youth sized HID patients. The CDC guidelines do not
recommend putting pediatric patients in PPE during EMS transport (2018). Thus,
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EMS agencies may need additional training on the use of (pediatric isolation
transport units) and child restraint system (Pedi-Mate). Keeping in mind that these
types of patients may be accompanied by a caregiver, who will need to be wearing
the appropriate protective gear and briefed on IPC practices.
Lastly, EMS agencies should expand their public health role and become
involved with community health monitoring resources, including participation in
the collection of patient-related data. EMS leaders and managers should continue to
recognize issues of interest, including crew safety and disease transmission, to not
only inform decision-makers but implement the needed training programs
accordingly. We advocate EMS organizations anticipating the transport of HID
patients to establish partnerships with receiving hospitals and facilities to identify
and solve common EMS problematic areas, including patient hand-off,
decontamination, waste management, and staff surveillance and monitoring.
Finally, although this project has identified the components of the seven
content areas for the EMS transport of patients with HIDs, utilizing this project to
develop an EMS-HID training program is not the last step. EMS agencies should
work on maintaining IPC competencies among their staff through frequent
exercises and drills, followed by a systematic training evaluation process, which is
to ensure the level of ID preparedness and quality among all prehospital providers.

41
As to the actual training, we propose the following:
•

We recommend that the EMS-HID training program be at least two
days to allow the adult learner the sufficient time to observe and
practice the highlighted skills in (‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an
EMS-ID Training Curriculum”).

•

Before the start of the actual training, it would be helpful for the
trainees to receive electronic pre-training learning materials and
videos that address communication strategies, IPC practices, Level C
PPE donning and doffing, PIU features, decontamination techniques,
and waste management.

•

We encourage using a verified checklist to guide students and
instructors on special equipment preparation, PPE donning and
doffing, biohazard spill management, and decontamination
techniques.

•

Developing the following documents can facilitate the delivery of the
training program and ensure quality throughout the project:
instructor manual guide, student manual, e-learning materials,
student and instructor assessments, and the appropriate evaluation
instruments.

•

Finally, conducting the appropriate pilot testing of the EMS-HID
training curriculum before delivery can be beneficial in highlighting
unrecognized gaps within the training.
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Limitations
This project has a few potential limitations. First, no attempt was made to
identify the credentials of the attendees nor their professional backgrounds. This
strategy was used to ensure that each member was equally represented and to
promote open discussion among all participants. The discussion was open to
achieve an overall objective of sharing knowledge and identifying consensus around
the seven pre-identified content areas. However, all of our working group
participants were self-identified as EMS and HID experts, along with CDC and ASPR
officials and other stakeholders.
This projected is also limited by the seven pre-identified Content Areas:
(learned from past EMS responses to HIDs, including EVD). There may be additional
EMS-HID problematic areas that were not identified in this project, including the
transport of pediatric patients with highly hazardous diseases and identifying atrisk patients through 911 HID-screening questions.
Additionally, and as we have mentioned earlier, current EMS-HID training
practices tend to be based on history and past responses and experiences but not
real scientific-based evidence to support a solid best practice for training purposes.
We encourage future research projects to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of an
evidence-based hands-on EMS training curriculum.
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Conclusion
The EMS Workgroup has wrestled with many of the distinctive challenges
and uncertainties surrounding the transport of patients with highly communicable
diseases. Areas of uncertainty included: using an ISOPOD versus the EpiShuttle,
draping the back of the ambulance when using a PIU, placing all medical equipment
inside the patient cabin, and the respective maximum time limit for providers in
PPE. These are areas in which future research could provide guidance in order for
EMS agencies around the U.S. to achieve a higher level of biocontainment. With that
said, we realize that controversies will always remain. We advocate all EMS agencies
anticipating the transport of HID patients to have close working relationships with
receiving hospitals to address common problematic areas and strengthen EMS
infection control procedures.
As we have seen in the recent COVID-19 outbreak, the value of training EMS
providers, who played a major public health role during the outbreak, on the safe
transport of patients with HIDs cannot be denied. At the conclusion of this project,
we attempted to provide perspectives and considerations, from 25 national and
international organizations, that will benefit prehospital providers caring for and
anticipating the transport of patients with special pathogens. The results can be
widely applicable for current and future training programs aiming at developing
better EMS-HID practices. Future research should focus on developing transport
recommendations for the HID pediatric population and identify the use of portable
isolators when transporting infants/children/youth sized HID patients.
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